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Abstract. Is new market creation a search and selection process within the theoret-
ical space of all possible markets? Or is it the outcome of a process of transforma-
tion of extant realities into new possibilities? In this article we consider new market
creation as a process involving a new network of stakeholders. The network is ini-
tiated through an effectual commitment that sets in motion two concurrent cycles
of expanding resources and converging constraints that result in the new market.
The dynamic model was induced from two empirical investigations, a cognitive
science-based investigation of entrepreneurial expertise, and a real time history of
the RFID industry.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, markets have for the most part been assumed as givens in economic
analyses. Even strategic and marketing management have taken their cues from the
exogenous markets of classical and neo-classical economics – rooted in rational
choice at the micro level, and propelled at the macro level by the notion of Pareto
optimality. Take for example, Arrow’s (1974) admission, “Although we are not
usually explicit about it, we really postulate that when a market could be created, it
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would be.” This postulate rests on the more general logic of optimal decision mak-
ing, based on the application of well-defined preferences to a known opportunity
set.
But the scope for this type of decision making, even when extended to include
systematic search, is severely limited. Evidence for limitations come not only from
empirical observations of how people actually make decisions (Kahneman, 2003),
but also from what we know now about how the brain works (Loasby, 2004) and
how human cognition is bounded both by biological and ecological constraints
(Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999). Several alternative models of decision making un-
der uncertainty have been proposed, including heuristics – ready-made decision
procedures or rules of thumb (Simon and Newell, 1958); routines – established
practices that have worked well in the past (Nelson and Winter, 1982); institutions
– collective norms and agreed-upon regulations on what to do and how to do it
(North, 1990; Loasby, 1999).
This bounded cognition further operates under Knightian and Shacklean uncer-
tainty, as well as Marchian goal ambiguity (Knight, 1921; Shackle, 1979; March,
1978). The only way bounded cognition can function at all under such circum-
stances is by bounding the uncertainty in the environment – by deeming irrelevant
a wide variety of information that may be available. This then begs the question
as to how relevance or irrelevance of particular pieces of information may be eval-
uated. One answer is that intelligent behavior consists in “satisficing” or limiting
search processes to the first “acceptable” solution – i.e. to search very locally and in
a contingent fashion. Another suggests developing internal capabilities specialized
to certain types of cues. Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) notion of absorptive capacity
is an example. A third solution consists in sticking with one’s social networks to
imitate and trade to find good solutions that satisfice.
Given that knowledge is always partial and dispersed among creatures of
bounded cognition, and that entrepreneurial environments are filled with uncer-
tainties of various kinds, what can we say about how new markets come to be? This
article provides a constructive existence proof – i.e. one particular model of how
new markets could come to be, without relying on neoclassical assumptions about
human rationality, knowledge, and exhaustive search and selection processes. The
proof was originally induced from two empirical studies of entrepreneurial exper-
tise.
We see four contributions to the thriving literature on new market creation:
1. The article provides micro-foundations for new market creation that are based
on bounded cognition and consistent with partial knowledge. This means that
realistic constraints on decision maker and setting (both spatial and temporal)
are taken into account.
2. The model assumes Knighian uncertainty, Marchian goal ambiguity and envi-
ronmental isotropy. So no onerous assumptions about the shape of the problem
space are made.
3. Our analysis moves from the individual through the inter-subjective to the social.
Being both dynamic and interactive, it overcomes the need to focus on one level
only while holding others constant.
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4. The proposed existence proof is at the heart of the formation and development
of new networks. In other words, it moves beyond static conceptions of social
networks.
2 Bounded cognition and new market creation as search/selection
The “bounded” nature of human cognition is no longer a matter of doubt or contro-
versy. It is recognized by economists and others alike that, as Simon (1982, p. 178)
described it:
Each of us sits in a long dark hall within a circle of light cast by a small lamp.
The lamplight penetrates a few feet up and down the hall, then rapidly attenuates,
diluted by the vast darkness of future and past that surrounds it.
Bounded cognition implies that we can only attend to a few things at a time and
that our planning horizon is short. Also, because relevant knowledge is dispersed
across many individuals (Hayek, 1945) it is not fully accessible to any one actor.
Ignorance, therefore, is a dominant input into human decision making (Kirzner,
1973) and as Simon and others have consistently stressed locality and contingency
rule the decision domain (Simon, 1982).
The roots of bounded cognition lie in biological evolution. But the evolution of
novel artifacts (new products, new ventures, new markets, for example) made by
the cognitively bounded human has a slightly different type of evolutionary cycle.
Loasby’s exposition of how bounded cognition and partial knowledge within a
highly uncertain environment manages to create interesting and valuable novelty in
entrepreneurship forms the jumping off point for our analysis, and as such is worth
quoting at some length:
Thus a particular example of environmental selection among random biolog-
ical mutations made possible a new evolutionary process that incorporated
directed variation: intelligence was guided by will towards the solution of
envisaged problems. However this process could not escape the context of
uncertainty and so it was still governed, although in a different form, by the
evolutionary principles of variation, selection and retention.
This shared development at the level of the species greatly enhances the
possibilities of distinctive development at the level of the individual, lead-
ing to the differential emergence of domain-relevant knowledge and skills,
which are much less demanding of cognitive capacity and brain energy than
general-purpose logical processing, against a continuing low-cost back-
ground of programmed bodily functions and brain operations. The con-
version of novelty to routine releases capacity for creating further novelty.
Hayek’s analysis is an appropriate illustration of this sequence: though the
physical order originated from sensory perception, it has led to innovations
that could not have been produced without evading the constraints of the
sensory order; nevertheless the sensory order is still essential to normal
human activity. The evolutionary process has itself evolved; but it is never-
theless an evolution and not a revolution. This, we shall argue, is true of all
innovation; discontinuities are never absolute.
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The conception of the human mind as an extensive cluster of quasi-
decomposable and selective connections corresponds with Jason Potts’
(2000) general proposition that the crucial fact about systems is the in-
completeness of their connections. If connections are incomplete, then the
performance of a system depends not only on what elements are included
but also on the links between these elements and the connections to other
systems. Performance may then be changed either by modifying the set of
elements or by a rearrangement of connections, internal or external. Such
changes are characteristic of intelligence and entrepreneurship. They can-
not be achieved by purely logical processes, though logical processes may
subsequently be invoked to check for consistency or to trace some of the
implications. (Loasby, 2004, p. 9).
Loasby’s arguments build upon the work of economists such as Smith, Knight,
Shackle, Hayek and Simon and are consistent with both biological and industrial
evolution empirically observed. They are further characteristic of a wide variety of
generalized problems in human decision making. We seek to embody these ideas
in the particular setting of the entrepreneurial creation of a new market.
Defining a “market” and the problem space for new markets
Before we define the problem of how new markets come to be, we need to define
the term “market.” Like fundamental terms in any major line of inquiry – take, for
example, ‘mass’ in physics, or ‘life’ in biology, markets are easier to argue about
than to define. The Nobel-winning economist Ronald Coase once commented that
markets – one of the two central institutions of capitalist societies (the other is firms)
- had a “shadowy” existence in the economic literature (Coase, 1988). Part of this
shadowy existence derives from the fact that the word “market” is used in a large
variety of ways (Menard, 1995, p. 168). In reviewing the literature pertaining to
new markets, we concluded that the various descriptions could coalesce into three
distinct categories: (1) Demand; (2) Supply; and (3) Institutions. Although it is still
not easy to keep the three categories empirically separate, it may be theoretically
useful to try.
A simple example suffices to illustrate how the three categories work together
in the definition of the term “market.” In sum, when we talk about the market for an
established product like Coke, we include all three meanings of “market” specified
above. First, there are people who want to drink Coke and are willing and able to pay
for it; second, there are people who are willing and able to make Coke for the price
that customers will pay for it; and third, there exist a variety of institutions such
as distribution mechanisms and FDA approval that allow/enable Coke to get safely
from the producer’s hands into the consumer’s body. The market for Coke is as easy
to recognize as the fact that emeralds are green. This is true of any well-established
extant market.
The problem of new markets, however, is not so simple. Even the Coca Cola
company found that out the hard way when it tried to introduce New Coke to
replace the old formula. As a variety of scholars have pointed out, the creation of
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new markets is fraught with incomplete information – and that is putting it mildly.
Even if we take demand as exogenous and relatively stable, there appears to be an
infinite number of ways in which extant demand could be met through technological
progress and the spread of free market institutions.And if we throw in endogenously
changing preferences into the midst, the problem quickly becomes intractable.
New market creation as a search and selection process
Yet, entrepreneurs and managers have to deal with the problem of the creation of
new markets. Furthermore, they often have to deal with the creation of new markets
concurrently with the necessity to survive in extant markets. March (1991) captured
the tradeoff inherent in this problem as the relationship between exploration of new
possibilities and exploitation of old certainties as follows:
Exploration includes things captured by terms such as search, variation,
risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation. Ex-
ploitation includes such things as refinement, choice, production, efficiency,
selection, implementation, execution.
The essence of exploitation is the refinement and extension of existing com-
petences, technologies, and paradigms. Its returns are positive, proximate,
and predictable. The essence of exploration is experimentation with new
alternatives. Its returns are uncertain, distant, and often negative.
A large number of empirical studies of the creation of new markets attest to the
uncertainty, time lags and failures involved in the exploration of opportunities for
new market creation. The literature on diffusion alone includes almost 4,000 studies
(Rogers, 1995), and attests to the fact that most new markets are unpredictable ex
ante, and take a long time to come to be, if they ever do come to be (Gort and
Klepper, 1982).
So, if we ask the question, “How can an entrepreneur starting a new venture,
or a manager in a large corporation, act on the problem of new market creation?”
the predominant answer today consists of some form of exploration of the universe
of possible markets. Even though boundedly rational creatures may explore only a
small portion of this universe at any given point in time, it is indeed possible to create
new markets through a process of exploration – i.e., through search, variation, risk
taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation, and so on.
In “The Birth of a New Market,” for example, Bala and Goyal (1994) postulate
that new markets are constantly “opening up” because of technological, political or
regulatory changes, saying that the emergence of the new market then depends on
the expectations of entrepreneurs and their requisite attempts to enter the market. In
fact the rhetoric of “entry” pervades a substantial portion of the growing literature
on new market creation (Ex: Geroski, 2002). Miller and Folta (2002) take a similar
view in “Option value and entry timing” where they describe a firm’s decision to
enter a new product or geographic market in terms of purchasing an option on being
involved in the market.
In the final analysis, either new markets exist in some theoretical sense and
firms enter these new markets through a variety of exploratory strategies, or new
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markets emerge as a result of technological and institutional evolution of popula-
tions of firms engaged in adaptive processes of exploration and exploitation within
a changing competitive landscape. As Penrose (1959) pointed out, not only does
exploration lead to the possibility of exploitation, but exploitation prepares the way
for exploration to find new uses for enhanced resources, leading to the transforma-
tion of both resources and the ends to which they may be put. This is consistent with
Loasby’s analysis of bounded cognition and partial knowledge leading to valuable
novelty.
But does such valuable novelty come to be through search, selection and adap-
tation only, or can it be the result of local transformations of extant realities? This
question challenges the “big picture” philosophy of a pre-existent universe of all
possible markets as the micro-foundation for action that we wish to re-examine in
this article. It posits instead the transformation of current realities into new possi-
bilities rather than search (however bounded or unbounded) and selection within
exotic regions of the unknown. “Discontinuities,” as Loasby argues, “are never
absolute.”
New market creation as a transformation process
Loasby’s arguments embody in a curious way the worldview of the epistemologist
and philosopher of mind, Goodman (1978)1: We have come to think of the actual
as one among many possible worlds. We need to repaint that picture. All possible
worlds lie within the actual one.
As we have already seen, the actual world is highly uncertain, and the human
agent has to produce valuable novelty from this uncertain world through his or
her bounded cognition. Unless we grant that all interesting variations are either
the result of random thrashing by limited agents, or that they are heroic revolutions
engendered by exotic imaginings, we have to reckon with the notion of willful agents
with complex motivations who recognize that they are among other intentional
beings with whom they can work together to construct, as well as, select new
possibilities. It is this empirical reality that we seek to embody and explicate in our
existence proof. To accomplish this, we begin with a rather simple, but illustrative
example of the creation of new markets – namely, the commercialization of the
internet (Reid, 1997).
Let us take a quick look at the chronology. By 1985, the Internet was already
well established as a technology supporting a broad community of researchers and
developers (Leiner et al., 2002). But it was not until 1993 that NCSA released the
first alpha version of Marc Andreessen’s “Mosaic for X,” and 1994, when he and
his colleagues left NCSA to start “Mosaic Communications Corp” (later Netscape).
Amazon.com launched its website in July 1995. Netscape went public in August
1995, initiating the Internet Bubble on the stock market. At the time, Nasdaq was
1 For readers who are more philosophically minded, the entire exposition at the core of this article
can be recast in terms of the Grue paradox that Goodman is very well known for. In other words, just
as emeralds cannot be proven to be green or blue, our model of how new markets come to exist deals
with the fact that markets are grue.
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still referred to as an OTC (over the counter) market, not the “virtual trading floor”
we talk about today.And finally, on October 24, 1995, the FNC (Federal Networking
Council) unanimously passed a resolution defining the term Internet.
First, from the supply side. How would a founder/developer of the original
Internet discover its commercial potential? Second, from the demand side. How
would a manager at Barnes and Noble discover the potential for retail distribution
through the Internet? Third, from the standpoint of institutions. How would an
organization such as Nasdaq transform itself into a virtual trading floor on the
Internet?
It seems almost immediately obvious, given our understanding of markets today,
that the various actors involved needed to explore a variety of possible markets and
also stand ready to exploit those that have high predicted value. As the chronology
shows, March’s insight that the returns to exploration are uncertain, distant, and
often negative, forms a pretty good explanation of why it took so long for people to
commercialize the Internet.As we know, underlying the worldview of exploration is
the philosophy that there pre-exists a universe of all possible markets that compete
for the winning candidacy – a space of all possible uses for the Internet, as it were
– and this space may be so vast and/or so sparsely populated with good solutions
as to require enormous amounts of search and experimentation, not to mention
dead-ends along the way.
But there is another explanation for why Barnes and Noble did not launch the
first Internet bookstore; or why Nasdaq could not envisage that Internet was the
way to go. And that explanation has to do with the fact that new market creation
is an isotropic process. Isotropy refers to the fact that in decisions and actions
involving uncertain future consequences it is not always clear ex ante which pieces
of information are worth paying attention to and which not (Fodor, 1987)2. In other
words, a phenomenon that looks ex post either like an exploration of all possible
Internet markets, or the exploitation of the Internet for commercial purposes, may
instead be the result of a series of transformations on the original reality, caused
by cognitively bounded and idiosyncratically motivated agents trying to solve a
variety of problems in a local and contingent fashion.
Isotropy and bounded cognition
Isotropy has been studied by cognitive scientists, roboticists and philosophers of
mind. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy explains Fodor’s definition of the
problem as follows:
For the difficulty now is one of determining what is and isn’t relevant.
Fodor’s claim is that when it comes to circumscribing the consequences of
2 Of course, Knight (1921) and Hayek (1952) both emphasized the fact that the information individu-
als pay attention to depends on the classification system used to group instances, and that commitment to
a particular classification scheme is unavoidable even if an individual is unaware he/she is making such
a commitment. Simon (1957) went on to point out that perception itself depends on the classification
system invoked. This argument also features in Kirzner’s (1973) concept of the entrepreneur, where
differential alertness is built on differences among the classification schemes invoked by entrepreneurs,
either implicitly or explicitly.
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an action, just as in the business of theory confirmation in science, anything
could be relevant. (Fodor 1983, p. 105). There are no a priori limits to the
properties of the ongoing situation that might come into play.
While Fodor would argue that it is not clear ex ante what we should pay attention
to because the environment is isotropic, some scholars have argued (e.g. Weick,
1979) that what economic actors pay attention to (which is limited, owing to their
bounded cognition) helps enact their environments, which suggests that human
action creates isotropy in the environment:
What the decision makers attend to and enact, the cues they use, why they
use those cues, their patterns of inattention, and their processes for scanning
and monitoring all become more influential as sources of selection criteria.
Reality as perceived by the members becomes more the source of selection
within the organization than does reality as perceived by some omniscient,
less involved observer. (Weick, 1979).
At the same time, practically speaking (a la Fodor), actors cannot know what
to attend to and what to ignore.
The three types of uncertainty that define the new market problem space –
Knightian uncertainty, Marchian goal ambiguity and environmental isotropy – ne-
cessitate some artificial bounds being put on the problem space for, as Shackle
observed, “the boundedness of uncertainty is essential to the possibility of deci-
sion” (Shackle, 1969, p. 224, cited by Loasby, 2004, p. 13). In other words, eco-
nomic actors have to make some commitments (Elster, 1979; Frank, 1988) that help
bound the problem space, commitments which necessarily involve “pre-rational”
mechanisms. How, where and why people commit to certain ways of bounding and
organizing the problem space is subject to substantial variation, and many varieties
have obvious potential for being mistaken for, “Whatever theory is then devised
will exist by sufferance of the things which has excluded.” (Shackle, 1972, p. 354).
The essential point is well summed-up by Brian Loasby, who’s work has delved at
length into these themes:
[If] we ask ‘How do we know?’we shall find that we know by setting bounds
to what we seek to know, and ignoring . . . what lies beyond. Of course this
policy exposes us to the risk that our apparent knowledge will be invalidated
by what we have shut out... Not only is knowledge necessarily bounded; the
bounds are necessarily imprecise . . . We are surrounded by uncertainty, in
Shackle’s sense. (Loasby, 200,0 pp. 4–5; italics as per the original).
The desire to set bounds to uncertainty motivates the willingness of economic
actors both individually and in their interactions with others to make commitments
to bounds, either consciously or unconsciously (by default), explicitly or implicitly,
deliberately or contingently. It is because such bounds have to be imposed that the
concept of commitment features strongly in the bounding process. Commitments
to some form or another of organizing problems is essential for meaningful action
by, and interaction between, economic actors.
Often economic actors depend upon and leverage already existing economic
structures which set bounds to uncertainty. Such structures are frequently described
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as institutions, which are useful precisely because they supply procedures and
premises which help economize on our bounded cognition. Again, to quote Loasby:
Institutions are a response to uncertainty. They are patterns acquired from
others which guide individual actions, even when these actions are quite
unconnected with any other person. They economise on the scarce resource
of cognition, by providing us with ready-made anchors of sense, ways of
partitioning the space of representations, premises for decisions, and bounds
within which we can be rational – or imaginative. They constitute a capital
stock of other people’s reusable knowledge, although, like all knowledge,
this is fallible. (Loasby, 1999, p. 46)
Institutions are therefore one form of domain-limiting assumptions and pro-
cedures that economize in the face of bounded cognition, Knightian uncertainty
and environmental isotropy. All such procedures are piecemeal, since there can be
no generalized algorithm for procedures (Winter, 2004). So instead of using gen-
eral purpose information processing, actors use domain-limited procedures, even
though they have no way of knowing if these procedures are appropriate.
However, the fact that institutions are widely shared and readily accepted ex-
plains why actors are willing to commit to them either in their present form, or in
some contingently transformed way. This sharing includes those institutions which
underpin individual markets. Markets are “a specific institutional arrangement con-
sisting of rules and conventions that make possible a large number of voluntary
transfers of property rights on a regular basis.” (Menard, 1995, p. 170). Markets
therefore make exchange cheaper than it would be without markets because market
institutions reduce a variety of “frictions” (MacMillan, 2002, p. 9) that otherwise
impose the costs of bounded cognition, uncertainty and isotropy on exchange. This
includes reducing the costs incurred in developing new interactions between the
demand and supply sides of the market, which often develop in a co-evolutionary
fashion as exemplified, for instance, in Geroski’s account of the evolution of new
markets, where one prominent cognitive institution that conjoins the demand and
supply sides of the market is the “dominant design” (Geroski, 2003; Utterback,
1994).
Fundamentally, the institutional tissues that connect the demand and supply
sides of markets into co-evolving dynamics reduce the cognitive costs otherwise
involved in developing new markets (Dopfer et al., 2004). New businesses can also
be created much more easily when an institutional framework pre-exists that sup-
ports a new market precisely because the cognitive frameworks on which the market
rests are already established, and do not represent a sheer free-riding / commons
problem / multi-agent prisoner’s dilemma (Olson, 1965). Entrepreneurs are there-
fore disposed to look for pre-existing frameworks that connect users and producers
and use them wherever possible, and such use leads inevitably to transformations.
In this sense, economic actors always start from the here and now, taking pre-
existing institutions and transforming them for new purposes. Again, there is no
way of knowing whether the transformed institutions are appropriate, any more
than there was a way of knowing the old ones were appropriate, and often they are
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not. But regardless, the bounding process is necessary and an inevitable part of any
entrepreneurial project.
Because entrepreneurs and managers do deal with the problem of the creation
of new markets on a regular basis, this raises the question of how entrepreneurs
starting new ventures or managers of large corporations act given the problems
of bounded rationality, uncertainty, ambiguity and isotropy? It seems obvious that
they bound the decision space by some pre-rational means as a precondition of
behaving intelligently in their environment, but how, and using what logic? And
what difference does it make whether we suppose markets are created through a
search and selection process within a space of all possible markets, or that they are
the result of a series of transformations on extant reality? These two questions form
the primary focus of the following existence proof3.
3 New market creation as transformation: a thought experiment
To clarify key elements of our theoretical development, we use a thought experiment
(Folger, 1999). The thought experiment is encapsulated in a dynamic model of how
entrepreneurial action transforms extant reality into new markets through a chain of
stakeholder commitments over time. We call the resultant network of stakeholders
an effectual network. First, we will briefly outline the dynamic model as it is laid
out in Figure 1, and then describe in detail the commitment at the heart of the model
through a thought experiment. We will then generalize the thought experiment and
describe how a chain of commitments forms the effectual network that transforms
extant realities into a new market.
Dynamic model of an effectual network and new markets
The dynamic model, graphically represented in Figure 1, has been induced from
two empirical studies, Sarasvathy (1998) and Dew (2003). The former consisted of
a verbal protocol analysis of expert entrepreneurial decision making, and the latter
chronicled the history of the RFID (Radio Frequency Identity) industry.
Currently major threads of research in entrepreneurship are based on the
paradigm of exploring the universe of all possible markets (however locally or
globally) and then exploiting those that are most predictable, and/or score high in
terms of expected return calculated a priori or some formal or informal version
of real options logic. We call this a causal process that begins with exploration
resulting in the identification, recognition or discovery of an opportunity, followed
by a series of tasks to exploit the opportunity. The standard set of causal tasks in-
cludes (a) developing a business plan based on (b) extensive market research and
(c) detailed competitive analyses, followed by (d) the acquisition of resources and
3 An existence proof addresses the question of whether a solution to a given problem exists. The
existence problem can be solved in the affirmative without actually finding a solution to the original
problem. (Weisstein, 2005). We are using a single instance (a thought experiment) of how the new
market creation problem could be solved at the micro level to argue there exists a general theoretical
solution. Actually proving that general solution itself is outside the scope of this article.
























Fig. 1. A dynamic model of the effectual network and the new market as an effectual artifact
stakeholders for implementing the plan, and then (e) adapting to the environment
as it changes over time with a view to (f) creating and sustaining a competitive
advantage. In this view, if an entrepreneur wanted to start a restaurant, he or she
would start by identifying a high potential location, analyzing the competition in the
area, identifying particular target segments, developing menus, de´cor, and market-
ing strategies to fit the targets, obtaining necessary funding, hiring the appropriate
chef to develop the right menu and then opening the doors to the restaurant.
As Figure 1 shows, effectuators, in contrast, may or may not start with an
“opportunity.” Instead they start with who they are, what they know, and whom
they know, and begin acting upon whatever they can afford to do (Sarasvathy,
2001). Most important of what they can do is to call people they know or meet, and
plunge straight into negotiating a series of commitments. We will examine these
initial commitments in great detail in the thought experiment below. For now, it
is important to note that the opportunity (real or perceived or otherwise) does not
determine who comes on board. Instead, those who come on board, and what they
commit to the enterprise, together with other contingencies that occur along the
way, determine what opportunity gets created4.
The ensuing chain of commitments sets in motion two contrasting cycles. The
first cycle increases the resources available to the venture by increasing stakeholder
membership in the effectual network; and the second accretes constraints on the
venture that converge into specific goals that get embodied in an effectual artifact
4 We do not wish to imply that entrepreneurs do not discover opportunities for new markets using a
causal logic. In fact, business schools routinely teach their students to do it that way. Our aim is to show
how opportunities can be created as well as discovered – especially, that new markets can actually be
created using an alternate logic that is both coherent and useful.
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over time. In the restaurant example above, the effectual entrepreneur may or may
not start with a location. Instead it would all depend on who the effectuator is. If
the effectuator is a cook, he might start a catering service, or a lunch service, or
even just hire himself out as a chef who does house-calls – it depends on what he
can afford to invest in terms of money, time, and emotion. An expert effectuator
would not even jump into one of these projects. She would start by calling people
she knows and start putting together partnerships and commitments. For example,
if she knew someone who owned a grocery store, she might partner with them and
start making dishes for their deli. Or if she knows someone in the popular media,
she might get involved with them to start a production company that makes cooking
videos. And so on.
In a causal worldview, the end product is determined by the initial “opportunity”
identified by the entrepreneur through exploration, and the adaptive changes over
time to exploit the pre-selected “market” and/or “vision” that is initially “envisaged”
as existing in the theoretical space of all possible markets. Success or failure of the
venture would depend on how accurate its predicted vision turns out to be and
how well it executes strategies based on that vision. The process in the effectual
world is fundamentally different. The end-product of this process is inherently
unpredictable at the beginning of the process because the process is actor-centric:
it depends on which actors come on board with what commitments. In fact, the
opportunity gets produced through a process that continually transforms existing
realities into possible markets. In our ensuing analysis of the effectual commitments
at the heart of the process outlined in Figure 1, we will concurrently trace the
expanding network and the converging artifact or new market.
The initial commitments
To understand how the first effectual commitment initiates the network of stakehold-
ers that transforms extant reality into new markets, we turn to a thought experiment.
Although we believe that this thought experiment can be generalized to a variety
of situations under which new markets come to be, for the sake of precision and
clarity, we will restrict ourselves to the creation of a new market for a new product,
say widget X . [Note: Widget X need not be technological. It can be a variety of
things, say, something in nature such as a lemon, or it could be a service, a work
of art, a minor irritation, a major problem, or an actionable idea].
Let us assume Entrepreneur E brings widget X to Customer C to make
a sale. [Later in the analysis, we will show that C can be any kind of a
potential stakeholder, such as an investor, a supplier, a strategic partner,
etc.] Also, for the moment, it does not matter whether we assume that E is
proceeding causally (i.e. has found C through predictive approaches such
as market research) or effectually (i.e has found C through non-predictive
mechanisms such as through her existing social network or some kind of
routine meeting events such as office parties or conferences).
Let us further assume that she wants to sell 1,000 units of X to C at $100
a piece. Let us now imagine that C says the following:
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“I will gladly buy X if only it were blue instead of green.” (Of course, the
very first C may or may not say this, but we assume E keeps talking to
people she knows or meets until she finds the first C who is interested)
NowE has a decision to make. Should she go ahead and invest in making the
widget blue (cost $10 K, say)? There are several criteria she may consider
in making this decision. First, she may or may not have the $10 K needed to
make the modification. Second, if she does make the modification, C may
or may not buy. Third, there may or may not be other possible customers
(say, D) who may be willing to pay >$100 (say, $120) per unit for a green
X – i.e. for the widget as is, without any modification.
Assuming thatE has the money to make the modification,E needs a mech-
anism that will decide whether C is indeed a customer (T = True) or is
actually a non-customer (F= False) who will not buy the modified blueX .
This mechanism, like any other mechanism we can devise will of course be
prone to two types of errors. It may either classify C as a non-customer (F)
when C is in fact a customer (T) [Type I error]; or, it might classify C as
(T) when C is actually not a customer (F) [Type II error]. Again, assuming
E has the money to make the modification, there are 3 possible solutions to
this problem:
Solution 1: Using the exploration paradigm, E goes in search of other pos-
sible customersD first. If noD exists, thenE gets C to sign a contract that
penalizes C if he decides not to buy the modified widget. [Note: This is
psychologically highly unlikely unless E and C have an ongoing relation-
ship of trust. In the case of an emerging new network, C faces two types
of uncertainties leading to contractual hazards here. (a) E may not be able
to deliver the modified widget as per contracted specifications (unknown
competence); or (b) it might not be possible to specify very clearly in ad-
vance what exactly C wants modified and C could find himself in trouble
by signing an incomplete contract].
Solution 2: E invests (or goes out and raises) $10 K in expectation of the
net profit due to the order from C. Without an enforceable contract, this
expectation is unreliable at best as a decision criterion. But E could also
do this effectually, using the affordable loss principle – i.e. not with the
expectation of any net profit from a potential transaction withC, but merely
as an investment that she could afford to undertake (and lose) with imagined
possibilities of other uses for the blue widget in case C chooses not to buy.
In this weakly effectual case too, this investment is not a reliable one for
market creation except in its potential for exaptation (Dew et al., 2004).
Solution 3: The final solution to the problem is the strongly effectual one
consisting of any mechanism that reduces Type I errors at the cost of in-
curring Type II errors. In other words, the effectual commitment always
favors the error of letting possible customers go as opposed to letting non-
customers drive the decision process. In our current thought experiment,
the strongly effectual solution takes the form of the following counter-offer
to C:
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“It will cost me $10 K to make the modification you suggest. I will
make the modification if you will put up the $10 K up front. In
fact, if you will pay for the modification, I will even supply you
the modified widget at $80 per unit, so ultimately you will end up
saving money on this purchase.”
[Note that this solution does not require E to search for all possible D’s
before making the counter-offer. And this explicit ignoring of opportunity
costs is what makes it different from exploration. We will examine the logic
for this in a separate section below]
Let’s now examineC’s decision as to whether he wants to commit $10 K for
transforming greenX into blue. Again, (1) C may or may not have the $10
K; (2) E may or may not deliver the modified widget; and, (3) C may be
able to find someone else to make the blue X for < $80 a piece. Assuming
that C has the money, while in the causal case it is obvious that he will
invest it with E only of there is no one who can supply blue X at < $80,
effectuation suggests he make a counter-offer to E as follows:
“I will invest $10 K to transform your green widget into blueX . But, instead
of a discount on the price, I would like to take equity in the product and
share future returns on it.”
The two effectual counter-offers together transform the relationship into a
partnership that commits both to a blue widget world. Furthermore, under
this partnership, both C and E need to specify blue X only to the extent
possible at this time, leaving it up for re-negotiation as they together develop
the product. E’s contractual commitment to undertake the modification
signals her private estimation of her own competence, and C’s investment
of $10 K identifies him as an actual customer (T).
In this thought experiment we have assumed that C knows he is indeed a
customer and E knows herself to be a supplier. But the effectual commitment
would work even if we reversed this assumption – i.e. if we assumed that C and E
have high levels of goal ambiguity, withC not quite sure that he actually wantedX
and E not quite sure that she wanted to make X (green or blue or otherwise), as if
neither knew whether there was a market or even a latent market forX . By meeting
each other and coming up with terms that were doable within the constraints of
their current lives, and then actually committing themselves to those terms, they
set in motion a chain of commitments. (Note: There is no guarantee that this will
indeed happen. All we wish to show here is how it could happen.) We will now
trace the consequences of such commitments actually occurring in the world.
The first consequence is that when two stakeholders make a commitment, they
are de facto behaving as though they are transforming green X into some X other
than green, including X’s no one could have imagined before the actual trans-
formation, and NOT selecting between a green X and a blue X . In our thought
experiment, this transformation process happens as follows: By walking into C’s
office and making the counter-offer based on the effectual commitment,E became
a supplier de facto. And by actually investing in E,C became a customer de facto.
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Each did not have to be 100% certain about their own potential as the two sides of
this commitment until the actual moment of commitment.
Their mutual commitments forge an initial network of stakeholders that even-
tually transforms extant reality into a new market. To the extent that widget X
is unformed and negotiable, this market is not a phenomenon of discovery but of
transformation leading to the creation of something new, which makes the market
forX an outcome of the interaction betweenC andE. Initially, neither party knows
what this X may or may not be worth down the road, or even whether it will be
green or blue or something neither imagines at this moment. The entire process is
driven by interaction – the stakeholders prospectively negotiate the very existence
and shape of X . The content of the negotiation is not much concerned with the
opportunistic potential embodied in the green vs. blue widget (for neither party
knows what this X may or may not be worth down the road or even whether it
will be green or blue or something neither imagines at this moment). Instead the
content of the negotiation is about what each would like X to look like and what
each is willing to “commit” to make it look like what s/he wants it to be. Thus,
the set of commitments that define an effectual network consist in agreements to
participate in the transformation of an existing widget, rather than in agreements to
appropriate future payoffs arising out of calculated/predicted evaluations of a new
invention.
In other words,C andE are negotiating for whatX “will” be – not in a predictive
sense (although prediction may or may not be part of the reasons for negotiating
between green and blue ex ante), and not in a social construction sense (although
the world may or may not actually come to consist of blue widgets ex post), but
merely in the sense that both actually invest in a blue widget world and actually
begin making blue widgets. Even more importantly, their negotiations proceed as
though X is transformable from green to colors other than green; not that X is a
choice among one of any given set of colors. The actual color, therefore, may or
may not be something either had imagined till their interaction at the negotiating
table. There is always room for the actual transformation to surprise them with a
color neither knew existed.
Generalizing the thought experiment
At this point we can take the discussion back to Figure 1 and see how the atomic
interaction within each effectual commitment results in the two cycles that increase
the size of the network and the resources available to it at the same time constraining
the possible goals of the stakeholders to converge into a new market. Also, we can
now generalize the thought experiment into a wide variety of new market contexts
and iterate it over time. For example, C and E can be angel and entrepreneur, in-
stead of supplier and customer. Or, they can be two random entities (individuals or
organizations) with problem components and/or solution components that match,
resulting in a strategic partnership that then leads to the creation of a new market
based on the combined solution they forge. And so on. In general, X can be any
component of a market including demand side elements such as needs and wants,
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supply side components such as technology, product and/or service, as well as insti-
tutional structures of a market such as channel, regulatory infrastructure, standards
bodies, and so on.
In this general conceptualization of X , each new membership in the effectual
network negotiates a tiny piece of the future market – a pleasing or meaningful
juxtaposition of two or more fabric patches, as it were – and the market that comes
to be eventually is like a quilt stitched together through the effectual network as
it grows and gradually transforms extant realities into the familiar artifact of the
market5. In essence, then, each new member in the network not only brings certain
resources to the venture, including who they are, what they know, and whom they
know, but also a set of constraints on what transformations can be carried out on
X . In other words, each additional hand that seeks to shape the artifact firms up
parts of the clay, as it were, necessitating fewer and fewer transformations that
are meaningful and useful in the future. It is this shared accretion of constraints
that eventually gets embodied in the demand and supply schedules, as well as the
institutional structures of the new market.
The effectual nature of the commitment process allows the members of the
network to proceed as though the universe at any given point in time consists
entirely of only the people who are at the table – as though the external world
is relevant only to the extent it is embodied in the aspirations and abilities of the
people at the table. In other words, the particulars of who they are, what they know,
and whom they know matter and drive the creation of the pie or the final artifact the
network ends up cooking up. It is only when the dish is done and the aroma begins
to waft out of the room that both the issue of opportunism (who gets what piece of
the pie) and opportunity costs (what other pies may be “out there”) become more
relevant. We will examine that transition next, as a dialectic between the members of
the network and the external world. [Note: In the interests of uncluttered exposition,
we will examine the two issues of opportunism and opportunity costs in more detail
later in the article]
The market as artifact, or How the effectual network grows into a new market
As the effectual network grows over time, and includes more and more of the
external world, it tends to become less effectual as it eventually coalesces into an
empirically distinct new market. In this section, we envisage this transition as a
dialectic between members already on board and the external world.
In his seminal work, Sciences of the artificial, Simon (1982) described the
artifact as lying on the thin interface between the inner environment and outer
environment. As all things artificial, the market created by an effectual network too
eventually becomes a dialectic between inner and outer environments where each
comes to resemble the other in important ways – just as shovels are designed to
5 Some parallels exist between our account here and recent work by Earl (2003) conceptualizing
entrepreneurship as involving “the construction of new systems by forming connections that have not
previously existed.” We are grateful for an anonymous (and entrepreneurial?) reviewer pointing out
these connections with Earl’s work.
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take the shape of the earth they need to scoop up at one end and the hands that hold
them at the other (Simon, 1982).
The new market, however, gets fabricated, not through the designs of any one
person, but as a chain of interactive commitments that form the interface between
the inner environment of the effectual network (current members of the network),
and the outer environment (current non-members). At any given point in time, the
effectual network is impacted by one of three categories of things: (1) interactions
that become embodied in actual additional commitments; (2) those that do not; and
(3) non-negotiable exogenous states of nature. The resultant artifact, i.e., the new
market that comes to be, is an outcome of how the network deals with each of these
three categories
Category 1: Interactions that become embodied in actual commitments. We have
examined this category in great detail in our thought experiment. In sum, interac-
tions that become embodied in actual commitments determine new membership in
the effectual network, as well as the initial shape of the artifact and its transforma-
tions into particular market structures. And as we saw earlier, the effectual network
proceeds for the most part by ignoring the external world, except in as much as the
external world is embodied in the actual members of the network. As the network
adds members, however, there is less room for transformational negotiations with
newcomers. Eventually, the network reaches a point where, new members have to
take most of X as they find it, or forgo membership in the network. At around this
point, interactions that do not become embodied in actual commitments carry vital
information to the survival of the new market.
Category 2: Interactions that do not become embodied in actual commitments.
Each negotiation that does not result in a commitment signals one of two possibili-
ties: (1) It suggests significant transformations yet to be negotiated to fabricate the
new market, or (2) It points to existing alternate markets or other effectual networks
that may eventually coalesce into alternate markets that compete with and dissolve
the nascent market being formed by the effectual network under consideration. In
other words, while each actual commitment transforms current reality into features
of a new artifact, rejected commitments point to bounds for the transformation and
signal finite alternatives to be explored.
With regard to interactions that do not result in actual commitments, members
of the effectual network can respond in one of three ways:
– They can ignore them and continue to build the network effectually;
– Begin exploring some alternatives to growing the network effectually; or,
– Declare the effectual transformation complete and begin competing with alter-
native markets.
In any case, there comes a point of time in the transformation process, when the
effectual network has coalesced into a market – i.e. when the continual effectual
churn at its outermost edges tapers off and barriers get shored up around its key
components. Once the chain of commitments has converged into a distinct new
market, at least for a reasonable length of time, the effectuators need to craft and
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implement strategies based upon the exploration-exploitation paradigm. This tran-
sition can either occur naturally as the effectual network converges to a new market,
or can be actively determined by members of the network in light of competitive
networks in the making. How this transition point actually occurs in the creation
of particular markets is a matter for future empirical investigations.
Category 3: Events completely exogenous to the process. This brings us to the fi-
nal piece of the dialectic between effectual network and outer environment, namely
the part that is completely exogenous to the process. This could consist in exogenous
shocks (positive or negative) such as those in the macroeconomic/regulatory envi-
ronment or in the technology regime, as well as some kind of internal contingency
such as the exit of a key member of the network. In case of such contingencies,
complete and cascading failure of the effectual network may not be avoidable, just
as explosive growth of the new market may become possible. In any case, such
contingencies will call for a certain amount of responsive re-shaping of the artifact
in question. To the extent that the collective imagination of the network internalizes
and leverages these contingencies as input into the shape of X the network will
continue to grow and coalesce into the stable artifact of a new market.
To summarize
We began our development of a new theoretical basis for the creation of new mar-
kets by positing a dynamic model of stakeholder interaction. This dynamic model,
graphically represented in Figure 1, illustrates how an entrepreneurial actor begins
with who he is, what he knows, and whom he knows, and sets in motion a network
of stakeholders, each of whom makes commitments that on the one hand increase
the resources available to the network, but on the other, adds constraints to future
sub-goals and goals that get embodied into particular features of the artifact. Over
a period of time, assuming the network keeps growing and is not dissolved due to
exogenous shocks or fatal conflicts within its ranks, the pool of constraints con-
verges into the new market. At the heart of this dynamic model is the atomic notion
of an effectual commitment. The effectual commitment has several characteristics6
:
1. It focuses on what is controllable about the future and about the external envi-
ronment, irrespective of their predictability; it also explicitly eschews predictive
information that cannot be encapsulated into controllable events.
2. Each effectuator needs to commit only what s/he can afford to lose, and need
not calculate predetermined target returns or outcomes.
3. Who makes actual commitments and what they negotiate in terms of features
of the artifact determines the goals of the network; pre-existent goals do not
determine who is induced to come on board.
6 These characteristics are elements of an effectual logic. For a book-length exposition of the key
ideas in this paper and their application to entrepreneurship in general, see Sarasvathy (2005).
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4. As means available to the network increase, goals achievable become more
and more constrained. In other words, what the artifact can look like becomes
solidified over time even as many more ways of how to make it look like what
the stakeholders want it to be become possible.
5. The key to the process here is not selection between alternatives (be they alterna-
tive ends or means), but transformation of existing realities into new alternatives
through a growing chain of effectual commitments. Harking back to Goodman’s
vision: We have come to think of the actual as one among many possible worlds.
We need to repaint that picture. All possible worlds lie within the actual one.
Commercializing the Internet through transformations
We emphasized earlier that the point of transformation in the context of new markets
is not some arbitrary point, but the act of commitment by two stakeholders to
a particular future X . And then we showed how that initial commitment sets in
motion an effectual network that grows even as it transforms extant realities into a
new market. Such a commitment in the history of the Internet can be located in the
partnership between Jim Clark (founder of Silicon Graphics) and MarcAndreessen,
who wrote Mosaic, the first web browser. That commitment launched “Mosaic
Communications Corp” that later became Netscape. Three different descriptions of
how the commitment came to be are provided in Appendix 1. The descriptions are
taken verbatim from (1) a historical account by Reid; (2) an anecdotal report on a
Stanford University website; and (3) a newspaper article published in USA today.
Taken together, the narratives suggest the following facts about the commitment:
1. Both Clark and Andreessen were doing their own thing, and did not envision
commercializing the Internet. Clark knew virtually nothing about the Internet,
and Andreessen knew nothing about business.
2. Foss, who came upon Mosaic, and showed it to Clark, did not knowAndreessen.
3. Neither Clark nor Andreessen searched for other possible partners before com-
mitting to the project – i.e., they did not take into account of any D, before
committing to C.
4. Clark and Andreessen were not part of the same social network. Even after
Clark and Andreessen met, they did not quite trust each other and had to work
at building a relationship.
Now we turn to understanding the role of opportunism and opportunity costs
in this crucial moment of transformation.
4 Opportunism and opportunity costs in effectual transformations
At the beginning of our analysis of the effectual commitment, we asked two ques-
tions. First, how can an entrepreneur/manager transform rather than search and
select? And what difference does it make whether s/he acts as though she is select-
ing from one of many possible markets or as though she is transforming existing
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realities into new markets? We have analyzed the first question in great detail and
illustrated that the key difference lies in ignoring opportunity costs – i.e. NOT ex-
ploring beyond the first effectual commitment; and then letting the growing network
of stakeholder commitments determine what the new artifact will be.
We can postulate that each commitment consists of two parts that go hand in
hand in both world views: (i) the commitment to X , the artifact; and, (ii) the com-
mitment to C, the network. The pivotal difference between the transformational,
as opposed to that of search and selection is that in effectual transformations, the
commitment toC trumps the commitment toX . In other words, through search and
selection, the entrepreneur/manager commits to a vision of the new market, and
that vision then drives their strategies as to which stakeholders they seek to bring
on board. Both X and C in this case are chosen through processes of exploration
– i.e. searching the space of possible alternatives (under standard assumptions of
bounded rationality). The problem here has to do with when and how the search
is brought to a halt. Presumably, the answer to that problem depends on the stated
goals of the enterprise. Criteria for evaluation of alternatives are developed based
on performance goals, and selection may be based either upon standard NPV cal-
culations or some form of real options logic.
In effectual transformations, the commitment to X , of course, is always tenta-
tive, always subject to change through the terms negotiated by new stakeholders
coming on board the network. Perhaps the effectual artifact X is more usefully
conceptualized as a series of transformations xi, rather than the notion of any one
X . The commitment to C, however, is substantial and very real, as C will have
a real voice in future stakeholder interactions. Furthermore, the commitment to C
not only involves actual commitments to particular transformations of X , but also
involves an explicit pre-commitment not to explore alternatives D before making
the commitment. It is this binding constraint of limiting oneself to the bird in hand
with regard to stakeholders that clearly distinguishes transformational actions from
decision making through search and selection. Now the question for the effectual
world at the point of commitment to any particular stakeholder becomes, “Why are
opportunity costs with regard to other possible stakeholders ignored?”
A textbook definition of opportunity cost would calculate the cost of an actionA
as the value of the alternative opportunityO given up in choosingA overO (Jensen,
1982, p. 48). Buchanan7, however, whose Cost and Choice is acknowledged as the
canonical analysis of opportunity costs, is a bit more subtle and elegant in the
opening paragraph of his preface (1969):
You face a choice.You must now decide whether to read this Preface, to read
something else, to think silent thoughts, or perhaps to write a bit for yourself.
The value that you place on the most attractive of these several alternatives
is the cost that you must pay if you choose to read this Preface now. This
7 Because proponents of Austrian economics have built upon Buchanan’s views on this subject, it
might be dismissed as not well received in mainstream economics. But Buchanan is very much in line
with leading economists as Hartmut Kliemt notes in the Foreword to the book, . . . Buchanan distances
himself somewhat from the Austrians. Avoiding what he regards as the “arrogance of the eccentric,”
Buchanan makes a serious effort to integrate his views into the orthodox classical and neoclassical
framework.
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value is and must remain wholly speculative; it represents what you now
think the other opportunity might offer. Once you have chosen to read this
Preface, any chance of realizing the alternative and, hence, measuring its
value, has vanished forever. Only at the moment or instant of choice is cost
able to modify behavior.
Yet, we have argued above that the effectual entrepreneur/manager explicitly
ignores the value ofD and bringsC on board purely based on the fact thatC makes
an actual commitment to modifyX – i.e. fabricate a piece of the new market. Since
each effectual commitment involves both a commitment to a transformation of the
artifact X , as well as a commitment to a specific stakeholder C, we will look at
each in turn next.
Committing to X: The problem of means and ends
By keeping motivations completely unconstrained in our analysis, we are in full
agreement with Buchanan’s position that choice influencing opportunity costs are
entirely subjective. In other words, how exactly particular individuals calculate the
values of their alternatives ex ante and whether they calculate their expected op-
portunity costs at all is irrelevant to our analysis. What is relevant is the assumption
that effectuators see X as transformable and not completely pre-determined.
Alternatives matter in a different way in effectual transformations than in search
and selection processes. In the latter, alternatives are searched for and drawn from
a universe of all possible alternatives – i.e. in this world, commitment to X , is a
commitment to X as the goal of action, and the allocation of resources is between
alternative means to achieve the pre-selected goal. In the former, alternatives are
envisaged as possible transformations of existing realities – i.e. commitment to X
is a commitment to a certain course of action xi that may or may not lead to any
envisioned X .
In this regard, our positions on ends and goals may be worth clarifying. Our
analysis is consistent with the fact that goals exist in hierarchies (Simon, 1964).
Also, while goals at the highest levels might be clear, their operationalizations at
lower levels may be highly ambiguous. Take for example the motivations of an
entrepreneur who may want to make $40M by age 40. This ‘goal’ while it may
appear specific and clear is not easy to translate into immediate sub-goals that
can actually be acted upon – i.e. it does not provide a compelling reason for the
entrepreneur to commit to any particularX . In this sense, an actor may experience
high levels of goal ambiguity even in the face of a clear vision of what s/he wants
down the road.
Our analysis is also consistent with questioning the assumptions that underlie
the idea that human action can best be understood as the pursuit of pre-conceived
goals. As Joas (1996) observes, some of the greatest thinkers of the twentieth
century including Dewey, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, and Ryle have
challenged those assumptions, and have argued for
. . . the impossibility of defining human life as a whole in terms of chains
of means and ends. . . . If we summarize these admittedly quite discrete
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arguments showing the limited applicability of the means-ends schema, we
find that neither routine action nor action permeated with meaning, neither
creative nor existentially reflected action can be accounted for using this
model. (p. 156)
Instead, Joas locates human action firmly within the continual interaction of the
human body (corporeality) with the real world (situation) and with other people
(sociality):
The means-ends schema cannot be overcome until we recognize that the
practical mediacy of the human organism and its situations precede all
conscious goal-setting. A consideration of the concept of purpose must
ineluctably involve taking account of the corporeality of human action and
its creativity. (p. 158)
In search and selection, choice of ends precedes choice of means; in an effectual
world, as we saw in the case of the effectual network, ends are outcomes of action
that depend at any given point in time on particular actors, and the immediate
transformations they commit to.
In terms of our analysis of new markets, we need to consider two sets of goals,
one consisting of the goals of individual members, and the other that of the effec-
tual network. While individual members may have a variety of goals in different
hierarchical schemes with different levels of ambiguities, the network’s goals are
always particular transformations on X . Therefore, only those individual goals
would be relevant to the analysis that any given member can embody in particular
transformations on the extant artifact. A lucid illustration of this can be found in
Lindblom (1959). When lawmakers sit down to draft a bill on say, partial birth
abortion, their prior positions on the issue are relevant only to the extent that they
agree or disagree about particular provisions of the bill, sometimes only to the ex-
tent of individual clauses. Therefore, even arch opponents on principles can come
together at the margin on particular provisions and end up with a draft of the bill
both sides can live with. And those who may be ambivalent at the level of princi-
ples can commit to particular provisions without first resolving their confusions as
to the larger values involved. Similarly, for our analysis, we do not need to make
any precise assumptions on individual preferences and goal clarity. Only the actual
commitments the stakeholders make to particular transformations of X drive the
fabrication of the new market. Reasons for making commitments may range from
pre-existent preferences to docility, passions and convictions to self-interest and
fun, reformatory zeal to indifference.
Furthermore, each individual commits only what s/he can afford to lose to make
those particular transformations. This is especially true in the initial stages of the
network since it is far from clear what X will eventually turn out to be, let alone
what it would be worth. Therefore, any calculations of expected return, even if ac-
tually carried out by members of the network, can be considered highly speculative
guesstimates at best. Effectuators, therefore, tend to focus instead, on the down side
– i.e. how much they are willing to lose on investing in the effectual commitment.
This calculation of affordable loss need not depend on any predictive assessment
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of the value of X . Instead, it can almost entirely be based upon a variety of things
that effectuators already know, such as, their current net worth, reliable sources of
future income streams, personal expense requirements, commitments already made
to others, and so on. Making a commitment based upon affordable loss calculations
minimizes (and can even eliminate) reliance on predictive information8.
As we shall see next, a similar non-predictive logic undergirds ignoring oppor-
tunity costs in the commitment to C.
Commitment to C and not D: The problem of opportunity costs
The key to the effectual commitment – i.e. the reduction of Type I errors even at
the cost of Type II errors – is that it does not predict but actually sorts prospects
into customers and non-customers, or more specifically, into stakeholders and non-
stakeholders. Each stakeholder comes on board the network by actually committing
to and investing in particular local shapes and features of the emerging new market,
subject to the constraints of everyone else already on board. In other words, every
new member who actually comes on board either re-shapes the market to the extent
they can persuade others to change their views or re-shapes their own preferences
to the extent they are docile toward the views of the others (Akerlof and Kranton,
2005; Earl and Potts, 2004). Notice that we are not suggesting a new “charisma”
theory of entrepreneurship, although some members of the network may indeed
be more charismatic than others. Instead, we rest our claims upon the fact that
all human beings, leader and member alike, are (to varying degrees) persuadable
(Simon, 1993).
Membership in the effectual network is not determined on the basis of who
“should” come on board, but is rather determined by who “can” come on board
subject to both the global constraint of transforming a new market and the pool
of local constraints that have been negotiated thus far. Some of these constraints
are lumpier than others. For example, any non-reversible investments such as those
involved in R&D reduce the fluidity of the pool and lower its ability to blend in the
contributions and constraints of potential new members. Eventually some lumpy
constraints coagulate into a stable local structure that forms a non-negotiable part
of the new artifact. New members now have to negotiate with this stable structure as
a single unit and new pools of contributions and constraints have to evolve around
this structure, forming hierarchies of stable structures in the growing artifact.
Through each of these stable structures, within the constraints outlined, the ef-
fectual network seeks to control the shape of the future to the extent it is controllable
through human action. In other words, the effectual network, especially in the initial
stages, does not have any global criteria with which to evaluate the worthiness or
otherwise of any particular prospective member. New membership is merely con-
tingent on actual local constraints negotiated with and within current membership
(Cyert and March, 1963). A negotiation that results in actual commitments is the
8 We are grateful for an anonymous reviewer drawing our attention to the connection between the
exposition here and Morgenstern andVon Neumann’s (1944) game theory, which was explicitly designed
to avoid reliance on predictive information, just as the thought experiment here is designed to do.
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only criterion that determines membership in the network. Therefore, the notion of
any objective opportunity costs to membership selection is largely irrelevant be-
cause selection in an effectual network is largely a process of self-selection, given
constraints already at work in the transformation ofX . In this way, the rejection of
opportunity costs with regard toD, also rejects the notion of the actual market being
one of many possible markets, and incorporates the overall effectual worldview in
which new markets are made from existing components in the actual world.
In common sense terms, the decision to ignoreD is a function of the uncertainty
associated with the market forX . IfD exists and is known with reasonable certainty
to be a customer or supplier for X , then it would not make sense for C and E to
proceed as thoughD does not exist. But in most new markets, there is considerable
uncertainty with regard to the existence of D. This is where the effectual logic
underlying the network becomes manifest and relevant. Given that E is already
involved in the creation of green X and C is already interested in blue X (for
reasons irrelevant to our analysis as we showed in the previous section), we can
consider two cases:
– Either C and E can proceed causally – i.e., as though there exists a market
consisting ofD forX (green and/or blue) largely independent of their particular
decisions, in which case, they will have to be careful to align their choices with
what this market consists of. Ergo, they need to invest in search processes for
findingD – i.e., the best possible sources for customers of greenX and suppliers
of blue X .
– Or, they can proceed effectually – i.e. as though the market is a result of partic-
ular actions they take, subject to the possibility of exogenous shocks, and the
necessity to modify their own selections as the market comes into existence. In
this case, they can proceed to make the commitments they negotiated with each
other knowing that they may have to renegotiate the shape ofX ifD exists and
is willing to commit whatever is necessary to come on board later.
So while the market in which D comes on board and one in which D does not
come on board would be very different from each other, there is no a priori way to
decide which of those two markets would be better for C and E to participate in.
Instead it makes sense for them to negotiate with any and all members who actually
make the commitments required to come on board. In sum, the calculable oppor-
tunity costs of not partnering withC always outweigh the incalculable opportunity
costs of not partnering with imaginedD’s elsewhere. Effectually speaking, the bird
in hand is always worth more than imagined birds in mythical bushes.
So far, with regard to the commitment to C, and not D, we have shown the
irrelevance of opportunity costs in the formation of the effectual network. But what
about the problem of opportunism?
Commitment to C: The problem of opportunism
Our analysis is fully consistent with social networks theories on the role and salience
of existing ties for each stakeholder in the effectual network. This is reflected in
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the fact that effectuators begin with who they are, what they know, and whom they
know. But in line with a an effectual universe, our analysis goes beyond the idea
that extant networks can be leveraged and managed, to encompass the notion that
new networks can also be initiated and developed. We use a simple typology of
how new networks may be initiated:
– Networks may form through random chance (Ex: Two or more people bump
into each other at the mall or happen to sit next to each other on an airplane)
– Networks may form in some path dependent fashion (Ex: Through garbage
cans). These can be intentional or unintentional
– Networks may form through the deliberate activation of an existing network –
again either with regard to achieving a pre-determined goal (causal initiation)
or by imagining ways to exploit an extant network (effectual initiation)
The history of entrepreneurial new market creation is full of unusual partner-
ships leading to the emergence of new networks. Instead of arising naturally as a
consequence of existing social networks, several of these seminal relationships be-
gan as intentional or co-incidental garbage cans (Cohen et al., 1972), such as the one
in which Clark and Andreesen, the founders of Netscape, met. Josiah Wedgwood,
too, was introduced to Bentley through his physician while he was laid up in bed in
Liverpool for many weeks from a knee injury. As Koehn (1997) describes it, “This
meeting was a fortuitous one for both men. It inaugurated a long friendship of great
depth and intimacy, as well as one of the most important business partnerships of
the eighteenth century.”
But the idea of initiating new networks begs the question about the role of
social networks as the primary arbiters of trust in exchange relationships. Current
theories of economics and organizations wrestle with the contradictory behavioral
assumptions of opportunism and trust. Opportunism, defined as self-interest seeking
with guile (Williamson, 1985), is a fact about human behavior. As is trust, defined
as affect-based belief in moral character (Wicks et al., 1998).
Sociologists have tried to leap across this divide by positing a tertius gaudens
of one kind or another, who through the good fortune of his/her position in a social
network acts as an arbiter of trust and legitimacy between two opportunistic parties.
Coleman (1990), for example, identifies the entrepreneur as an arbiter of trust, while
Olson (1986) points to the government, as the tertius gaudens of ultimate resort.
Based on a detailed review of the vast literatures on this subject that we will
not present in this article, we conclude, in line with several scholars in the field
(Rabin, 1998; Simon, 1993; Moran and Ghoshal, 1996; Mosschandreas, 1998),
as follows: Both the volume of theorizing and the weight of empirical evidence
suggest that it might be fruitful to move away from strong behavioral assumptions
of either opportunism or trust-based ties toward a more realistic starting point –
namely, that in most cases at the beginning of the formation of a network, actors
simply cannot predict the motives of those they interact with nor can they always
predict their own motivations. That is why it makes sense for effectuators to rely on
actual commitments rather than on predictions based on past behavior, or promises
endorsed by third parties.
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In the effectual network, only those members who make actual commitments
form the membership of the network. This provides a substantial deterrent to free
riders and opportunists. Furthermore, by requiring a large amount of willingness to
change the shape of X without guarantees of larger shares of the eventual pie, the
effectual network tends to select out opportunists and select in intelligent altruists
including those who persuade others to be altruistic. Also, opportunists have real
opportunity costs in the form of other more predictable markets with low hanging
fruit (as opposed to those under construction through effectual networks). Joining
and working with an effectual network requires them to forgo those other oppor-
tunities that provide more immediate and surer gains. To a great extent, therefore,
effectual networks eradicate the need to overcome opportunism, by merely making
it irrelevant to the creation of new markets.
Note that this does not mean that the very same members of the effectual
network who behave in an intelligently altruistic fashion in the beginning will not
behave opportunistically as the market coalesces into more predictable outcome
distributions. All that the effectual network does is to cue in intelligent altruism
at the earlier stages, leaving open the possibility of opportunistic behavior later in
the development of the market. This is very much in keeping with an evolutionary
explanation for the concurrent existence of opportunism and altruism in human
behavior. As Thompson (1998, p. 305) states:
Because selection has sometimes favored individualistic and at other times
collectivist behavior, the human species has evolved not only the capacity
for both kinds of action but probably also a complex cognitive device for
figuring out in a given situation which kind of action, collective or individ-
ualistic, is likely to produce the best genetic outcome.
5 Conclusion
We started out trying to understand how an entrepreneur/manager can act in a
world of bounded cognition, partial knowledge and a variety of uncertainties in the
problem space. We showed that forging a network of stakeholders based on actual
commitments to particular transformations of extant realities into components of
the new market entails an effectual logic – i.e., a logic that allows who comes on
board to determine what the new market will look like, rather than let predicted
visions of the new market drive the search for and selection of new members. We
end by presenting a few good reasons as to why the particular model we present
matters.
A number of scholars in evolutionary economics have articulated the neces-
sity for developing rigorous and useful micro-foundations for the discipline (in
particular, Dosi, 1997; Loasby, 1999). They contend that there is no theory of en-
trepreneurial/firm behavior that is consistent with the basic supply-push story of
how new markets are created that has been articulated in evolutionary / Schum-
peterian economics (Rosenberg, 1996; Klepper and Simons, 2000; Geroski, 2003).
What emerges from comparing and cumulating the (by now) wide range of empir-
ical studies on new market / industry founding is that the results are inconsistent
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with the micro-theories based on which the data were analyzed. Some fundamental
aspects of extant theories must be seriously mis-specified (Griliches and Mairesse,
1995; Dosi, 2004). In other words, conventional accounts of entrepreneurial/firm
behavior (either maximizing or satisficing) do not mesh well with conventional
accounts of industry founding. In particular, we have to reckon with at least two
stylized facts:
One, consumer tastes are ambiguous / inchoate / ill-defined / evolving in new mar-
kets. This means the market cannot be found or predicted. Alternatively, even if we
take tastes to be reasonably stable as Lancaster (1971) and Stigler and Becker (1977)
model them, consumption technology is changing, i.e. consumers are learning-by-
using a technology. Either way, what consumers want is ill-defined, so there is
no well-articulated demand, and therefore no market, “out there” to be found or
predicted (Langlois and Cosgel, 1993; Earl, 1998; Geroski, 2003, pp. 28–29). This
challenges both the descriptive and prescriptive theories about firms doing market
research to predict and innovate to pre-existent demand. Mowery and Rosenberg
(1979) and Dosi (1997) have made compelling arguments against demand-pull
theories in general. In sum, these arguments add up to the conclusion that abstract
demand does not do much to influence the direction of innovation and the creation
of new markets. It cannot.
At the moment, theories of market process have “black-boxed” this problem by
assuming that different entrepreneurs / firms make different guesses about demand
(e.g. Geroski, 2003, p. 46). In other words, we have the tautology that variation
causes variation. But not only does this not “explain” much about how new markets
come to be, it also is falsified by empirical evidence. Entrepreneurs do not “leave it”
to differences in tastes or behavior to build markets. They work very hard to make
tastes cohere and to concurrently embody them into particular transformations in
real artifacts. While not all such artifacts may “succeed” down the road – i.e. while
selection and retention over time may well be evolutionary, almost all variations
are non-arbitrary. An effectual logic undergirds the creation of variation.
As scholars we have a decision to make. We can either use, as Milton Friedman
did, Vaihinger’s as-if philosophy to argue that for macro-theorizing we need only
to proceed as if variations get generated randomly; or we can argue, as Simon
argued, “that no self-respecting physicist would ignore observed facts.” This will
necessitate we roll-up our sleeves to build micro-foundations based upon the facts.
Two, the basic evolutionary view is that new markets are pushed-up from the supply
side based on the transformation of existing artifacts; often based on transforming
new technology into a marketable product. In particular, entrepreneurial firms create
an enormous amount of product variation around the initial components of a new
technology, i.e. product variation at the birth of markets is large. Different firms do
business by bringing different products to the market. The argument that scholars
have used so far is that this is a function of the fact that the technology is often
new, so it is “wide open” to innovatory exploration of its various facets, and that
consumer tastes are ambiguous (see above) so different firms make different guesses
about what consumers really want.
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But this “explanation” again “black-boxes” the process by which certain prod-
ucts are developed and not others. Taking an economic view, why does competition
not lead firms to converge very quickly on the same product designs? Or in the
sociological view, why don’t the few and rare legitimation agencies quickly nar-
row the field to a few valuable new markets? Instead, what we actually observe is
enormous variation. Effectuation illuminates these patterns of variation by show-
ing how bounded cognition, partial knowledge and the necessity to commit along
particular lines of the problem space work together to stitch together new mar-
kets piece by coherent piece. If individuals knew what they wanted (to the degree
and precision that a neo-classical economist would like) and/or if the environment
maximally constrained what agents could do (to the satisfaction of the die-hard
sociologist), new market creation would actually be easier and happen faster than
the facts warrant – bounded cognition notwithstanding.
But stitching together patch by patch, and building coherence commitment by
commitment takes the time most markets take to coalesce – 15 years and counting
in the case of the Internet for example (other examples: Gort and Klepper, 1982).
Furthermore, the effectual logic at the heart of this inter-subjective process is em-
pirically observable, theoretically feasible, and prescriptively useful in telling the
troops what to do on the ground.
In sum, the effectual (non-predictive, non-adaptive, non-teleological) process
of accumulating stakeholder networks through a chain of commitments undoes
the black box. It shows us what’s inside and how we can use the contents. And it
does so in a way that is completely congruent with what we know about consumer
preferences at the birth of new markets, i.e. that they are ambiguous, and therefore do
not justify either predictions or guesses. Instead, entrepreneurs work out of means,
use affordable loss, leverage contingencies and rely on stakeholder commitments.
Four decades ago, the behavioral theory of the firm helped open up the black
box of established organizations. The seeds planted then have led to a rich tradition
of research in evolutionary economics and a textured understanding of industry life
cycles and the economics of new technologies. That research has also raised new
questions about the creation of new markets. We hope our analysis begins to scratch
the drawing board of a behavioral theory of the entrepreneurial firm that operates
at the birthing place of new markets.
6 Appendix
Reid (1997)
In early 1994, Bill Foss loaded Mosaic (the world’s first web browser created by
Marc Andreesen) onto his computer and watched as Jim Clark clicked his way
through the internet. As Reid (1997) describes it: It was Clark’s first glimpse of the
Web. Before he was done, he E-mailed Marc. You may not know me, but I’m the
founder of Silicon Graphics, his message began. Reid goes on to explain that the
first few meetings between the two men did not go very well: Foss remembers Marc
as “this kind of ungainly twenty-two-or twenty-three-year-old kid [who] doesn’t
quite know what to make of this corporate culture, so he’s put a tie on” (ties were
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passenger-pigeon rarities in the corridors of the company Clark had founded) . . .
But.. Marc “kind of built up his comfort level with Jim” over the subsequent weeks,
Foss recalls.
Stanford website
Clark left Silicon Graphics in January of 1994 with the vague intention of starting
a new software company, perhaps involving interactive television. Near the end
of his time at SGI, colleague Bill Foss showed Clark a new program he found.
That program was Mosaic. Clark was smitten, and he took note of a Mosaic page
showing Andreessen and where he was. Clark contacted Andreessen and the two
met, with excellent results. “He was one of the sharpest people I had ever run across,”
Clark told the San Jose Mercury News. And Andreessen’s reaction to Clark, “His
vision, knowledge about markets and ability to execute were right on target.” The
two discussed various business opportunities and developed no sure-fire money-
making idea, but in the end Clark’s entrepreneurial spirit could not be checked.
“You think of something to do,” Clark instructed Andreessen, “and I’ll fund it.”
For Andreessen, there was no reason not to join forces with Jim Clark. Friction
had been building between the NCSA management and the Mosaic programmers
for several months, and Andreessen was looking for a way to get out. Management
issued glowing press reports about Mosaic, but declined to mention Andreessen or
the other programmers in any great detail, thus preventing them from receiving the
accolades which they were due. In essence, the young team of Mosaic programmers
saw themselves as under-paid, under-appreciated, and overworked.
Andreessen soon left the NCSA to found Mosaic Communications Corporation.
Shortly thereafter he sent e-mail to his former colleagues: “Something’s going
down. Be ready to move.”
The company was born.
Maney (2003) – In USA Today
At NCSA in 1993, Mittelhauser and Totic recall, Andreessen got fed up with battles
over Mosaic, so he left for Silicon Valley. Marc was like an ongoing soap opera,”
Totic recalls. “He got this pathetic job where he was, like, an intern, and he was
e-mailing us daily dispatches. Then one of them said that he’d met Jim Clark. We
were all like, ’Who’s Jim Clark?’ ”
In one of those small but pivotal events in history, Bill Foss, an assistant to
Clark at computer maker Silicon Graphics, then one of the Valley’s most exciting
names, had told Clark he should e-mail Andreessen. Foss had followed Mosaic
and knew Clark was casting about for another company idea. But Clark barely
knew anything about the Internet. At SGI, he’d worked mostly on the hot field of
interactive television. Andreessen was sick of Mosaic and wanted to do something
else. “We had two business plans,” Andreessen says. One was in interactive TV.
The other was to build an online gaming network for Nintendo machines.
One day, Clark says, he and Andreessen were in Clark’s living room, struggling
over ideas. Andreessen said he wanted to work with his NCSA buddies but was
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afraid they’d get recruited somewhere else. “Right there, in that moment, we said,
’Let’s reproduce Mosaic,’ ” Clark says. “We hopped on a plane and flew to Illinois
in the middle of a thunderstorm. We met the (rest of the NCSA gang) at a hotel and
recruited them in 24 hours, and suddenly we had a company.” To celebrate, “We
all went to the hotel bar,” Totic says. “I remember there was a lot of Ja¨germeister.”
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